Avinash Azad
In a revelation that reinforces long-standing allegations about Pakistan’s deep control over separatist politics in Kashmir, Dr. G. M. Hubi — a close associate of Syed Ali Shah Geelani and a former executive member of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference — has openly attributed the Valley’s prolonged turmoil to the ISI’s diktats and Geelani’s rigid religious positioning. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, known as a hardliner among Kashmir’s separatist leadership, died in September 2021 at the age of 91. Speaking in a detailed interview, Hubi termed the recent Delhi terror attack “unfortunate” and squarely blamed external manipulation and internal radicalisation for the chaos that engulfed Kashmir for decades.
Dr Ghulam Muhammad Hubi, speaking to Sufi Hidayah on Kashmir Unfiltered, sharply criticized the reported participation of highly educated Kashmiri youth — even doctors — in the Delhi terror blast. The interview was shared on X by @FatimaDar_jk. “It is unfortunate. If Kashmiris are involved, it is a curse upon them that educated Kashmiris did this… Terrorism is not a solution to anything. You may have disagreements — disagreement is a sign of democracy — but disagreement should not turn into terrorism,” he said.
Adding perspective to the 1996 Assembly elections boycott, Hubi recounted one of the most controversial decisions taken by the Hurriyat leadership. As secretary of the Hurriyat Executive Committee, he said he had opposed the boycott, arguing that even the Congress and Muslim League contested elections under British rule. “But nobody paid attention to me. At that time, nothing was in the Hurriyat’s hands — everything was being dictated by the ISI in Pakistan. The Hurriyat was like their puppet in Kashmir. Whether it was elections or militancy, every decision was imposed on the Hurriyat by the ISI,” he said.
His statement aligns with confessions made over the years by several former separatist leaders who admitted that Pakistan influenced electoral boycotts, protest calendars and militant strategies to maintain instability.
Responding to a question on how the Hurriyat maintained mass street influence if it had no control, Hubi said, “Everything was dictated from elsewhere, and it is now an open secret. Every action in the Valley was carried out on the ISI’s orders.”
Citing his interactions with militant groups, Hubi recounted the visit of Al-Barq Tanzeem’s media head to Charar-e-Sharief. “I advised him that guns had played their role… Now guns should act only as watchdogs; they should not interfere in political matters,” he said. The seven-member Hurriyat Executive Committee at the time included Geelani, Lone, Abbas Ansari, Prof. Abdul Gani Bhat, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Yasin Malik and S. A. Mir of the People’s League. Hubi asserted that only he and Abdul Gani Lone believed Kashmir was fundamentally a political dispute. “Geelani Sahab believed that Kashmir was a religious issue,” he added.
Hubi said he never accepted Geelani’s argument that Kashmir was an Islamic issue. “I have always believed it is a political issue, and Abdul Gani Lone held the same view. If I had spoken publicly, they (the terrorists and the ISI) would have eliminated me, just as they eliminated Lone Sahab for his words.”
Lone, who had warned against foreign militants trying to become “masters,” was assassinated in 2002 — an incident widely linked to internal ideological rifts and external pressure.
Hubi also recalled the killing of journalist Mohammad Shaban, which terrified Kashmir’s press fraternity. “When I condemned the act… Ghulam Sofi told me, ‘Don’t speak like this; the situation does not allow anyone to speak against militants.’ The militants had something else injected into their minds,” he said. He said such restrictions on speech were common at the time, with militants often sending bullets in envelopes to intimidate writers and intellectuals.
“I still believe the Kashmir issue can only be resolved politically, with sensible approaches from both India and Pakistan,” Hubi said, explaining why he distanced himself from the Hurriyat in 2004.
The years preceding his exit, he said, were marked by constant threats. “Once, around 150 people came to my house to kidnap me… Before 2004, militants would often visit my house, but later I never provided them shelter.”
Hubi also gave an unexpected account of 2016, when Kashmir erupted after Hizbul commander Burhan Wani’s killing. “I saved the lives of four CRPF personnel from a mob by giving them shelter in my home,” he said, describing it as consistent with his non-violent approach.
He shared details of his personal journey through Kashmir’s turbulent years — surrendering his licensed gun at the onset of militancy, facing PSA for public mobilisation, and receiving 17 job transfers during his 11-year medical career. “I contested the 1987 Assembly elections and later became part of the Hurriyat,” he said.
“People may label me as someone’s agent for saying this, but the fact is that earlier government benefits existed only on paper and were siphoned off by a select few. Today, the government is delivering welfare directly to the intended beneficiaries,” Dr. Hubi concluded.
The interview marks one of the rare moments where an insider publicly acknowledges the degree to which Pakistan’s ISI shaped separatist politics, manipulated decisions, and stifled dissent — while moderates like Lone and Hubi paid a heavy price for advocating political engagement over radicalisation.
